ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Since Eric Stein's groundbreaking work on the legal integration of the European The central concern shared among these works is how to lend theoretical support for this European phenomenon: that a constitutional order emerges without the making of a constitution. 4 However, this legalist-constructivist approach to lay theoretical foundations for the development of the European constitutional order has also been criticized as exemplary of the tendency towards 'juridification' of European constitutional politics. The constitution of Europe driven by the ECJ is based on a self-creating process of constitutionalization, which is detached from traditional constitution making at a constituent moment.
12
She argues that the creation of the Constitutional Treaty reflected the ambition of political elites to rebuild the European constitutional order on the 'myth' of making a constitution through the exercise of the constituent (or constitutive) power (pouvoir constituant).
13
Rev 555-83. 7 See Chalmers and Tomkins, (n 6) 73. In this review article, I argue that Everson's legalistic attempt to 'constitutionalize' the European legal order in the place of the citizenry's constituent political action illustrates the general tendency towards juridification among scholars concerned about the European constitutional project, explaining why current strategies of European constitutional politics have hit the wall. I suggest that the faith in the neutrality and autonomy of the law, which lies at the core of Everson's argument, rests on a shared epistemic form that holds the European legal professional community together. To project a legalistic constitutional order onto the whole European citizenry, however, would assume the centrality of the legal 14 Ibid, 2, 14-19. 15 The Irish people rejected the Lisbon Treaty and put the reform of the EU institutions in limbo by a margin of 53.4 % to 46.6 %. See To do justice to the constitutionalization of the European legal order, Everson and her colleagues need to tackle squarely the role of constitutional politics in the making of a constitutional order, which traditional constitutional dualists aim but fail to address.
19
On the contrary, as Everson and Eisner's book shows, the legalist-constructivist strategy of European constitutional development fails for its slipping from the dualist myth to the community fiction that they hold dear.
In addition to an Introduction, this article consists of three parts. Part 2 describes the positions that Everson supports and opposes, and argues that her theory suggests a postconstituent view of constitutional ordering. Part 3 constitutes the core of this article.
An interlocution with Everson shows that her assumption of legal autonomy belies her methodological claim that she makes the case for a postconstituent European constitutionalism by employing empirical studies and interpreting the ECJ jurisprudence in light of critical legal scholarship. Although I agree with Everson on her diagnosis of the integrity of the legal profession in Europe, I argue that her aspirations for the professional community as the political foundations of the European constitutional order are only feasible in the lawyers' dream world. Projecting the legal professional community as one with which citizens will come to identify is fictional. In Part 4, I conclude that Everson's 17 See de Búrca, (n 6) 556, 557-58. 18 
DEMYTHIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT: TOWARDS A POSTCONSTITUENT CONSTITUTION
The traditional view of making a constitution through the exercise of the constituent power at an exceptional time lies at the centre of Everson's critique. After introducing this object of criticism, I proceed to discuss her proposal for a lawyer-centred, constructivist view of the making of a constitutional order and explain why her theory points to a postconstituent view of the constitution. 
Sovereign Political Community
The distinction between the constituent power and the constituted power (pouvoir constitué) has organized the constitutional tradition established by the American and French
Revolutions since the late eighteenth century.
21
According to this dualist view of constitutional democracy, the legal order under a constitutional regime can be divided into two categories: the constitution (including the capital-C constitution and constitutional law comprising judicial interpretations and other constitutional practices) 22 nonconstitutional, ordinary body of law. 23 The legitimacy of the constitution rests on popular sovereignty, which embodies and extends its political will in a constitution through the exercise of the constituent power by 'We the People'.
24
As regards the ordinary body of law and the power to enforce it following the making of a constitution, they are 'constituted' in nature, as opposed to the constituent power. The legitimacy of the nonconstitutional legal order is a matter of constitutionality: the exercise of the constituted powers is legitimate inasmuch as it is in consonance with the constitution. Under the assumption that the legitimacy of the constituted legal system hinges on its constitutionality, the scope and content of the constitution must be identifiable through constitutional interpretation so that the nonconstitutional laws can be evaluated according to the criteria provided for in the constitution. In this way, notes Everson, this dualist constitutional settlement is constructed around the idea of 'logical perfectionism'. 
B. For: Everson's Legalist-Constructivist Theorization of the European Legal Ordering
Departing from the dualist structure of constitutional settlement, Everson reinterprets the origin, evolution, and prospect of the European constitutional order in light of the notion of 'Self-constitutionalizing law' (Rechtsverfassungsrecht)'.
41
At the core of this virtually untranslatable concept is the self-creating process by which the ordinary legal system gives itself a set of core values and distinguishes among the values emanating from judicial decisions in a hierarchical order, remaking itself into a constitutional order.
42
This sets
Everson's theory of the constitutionalization of the European legal order apart from her academic colleagues.
What is characteristic of Everson's 'Rechtsverfassungsrecht' is a relationship of immanence between law and society.
43
Against legal classicism, 44 she agrees with the critique made by legal realists that it is a legal fiction that the law as a normative system stands independently of, but governs, social reality. Rather, the law must respond to the 'real-world' needs from society. 45 However, Everson emphasizes the 'autonomy' of the legal system as a normative order.
46
She not only disputes the critical view that equates law with politics but also defends the law against colonization by other disciplines such as 41 Everson attributes Rechtsverfassungsrecht to German legal scholar Rudolf Wiethölter. Ibid. 22-26. As for the translation of Rechtsverfassungsrecht, Everson notes, 'Sadly another phrase that is impossible to render properly in English'. Ibid. 38 n 46. Nevertheless, after regarding it as 'the sobriquet,' she refers to Rechtsverfassungsrecht as 'self-constitutionalising [sic]/ socially constitutive law'. Ibid. 25. 42 Ibid. 25-26. 43 the social sciences.
47
Law is not the mirror of politics or any particular academic disciplines. Law reacts with, but stands above, political actions; legal reasoning concerns more than scientific assessments.
Everson situates the contention between legal classicism and legal realism within the dilemma at the heart of Max Weber's legal sociology: formalism vis-à-vis materialism. As
Everson paraphrases, in Weber's view, adherence to formal rationality in the law results in the gap between law and society, undermining the faith in the law, while bringing substantive or material rationality to legal reasoning would impair the neutrality and autonomy of the legal system, placing legal legitimation in jeopardy. Borrowing sociological theories of law from Eugen Ehrlich, Herman Heller, and
Wiethölter among other German-speaking scholars, 51 Everson argues that the norm is immanent in the dynamics of social relations that call for the legal system to adjudicate.
52
The dynamics of social interaction do not suggest a lawless world that waits for legal 46 Ibid. 12. 47 Ibid. 41-44. 48 Ibid. 23, 61-62. 49 Ibid. 54, 62. 50 Ibid. 24-25. 51 Ibid. 22-26, 62.
intervention. Norms that govern behaviour in social relations can be discovered in the interactions among social actors.
53
From the legal sociological point of view, Weber's dilemma is resolved and the legitimacy of the law is maintained inasmuch as the law responds to real-world needs by grounding its called-for answers in the extralegal norms forming in the dynamics of interactions among social actors.
54
Seen in this light, the relationship between the legal system and social reality becomes immanent. Moreover, the issue of whether a judicial decision looks formalist or is imbued with substantive rationality is beside the point. What matters is whether the law responds effectively to real-world needs. A legal opinion that is constructed around legal formalism may be applaudable if it results in the effective resolution of the social issue that initially calls for intervention from the legal system.
55
Everson notes that the purpose of the legal system is to provide neutral norms to regulate social reality. Norm-giving by fact finding is legalistic and characteristic of Everson's treasured reflexive legal reasoning.
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Alongside formalism and materialism, 'reflexivity' emerges as the third paradigm of the law that sits between facts and norms, shining light on the question that Weber failed to answer.
58
In addition to her attempt to resolve the formalism vis-à-vis materialism debate, 52 Ibid. 75, 114. 53 Ibid. 219-20. 54 Ibid. 25-26. 55 Ibid. 50-55. 56 Ibid. 55, 60. 57 Ibid. 43-44.
Everson tries to revolutionize the relationship between revolution and the legal order in order to redefine the democratic foundations of the European constitutional order. Instead of considering legal indeterminacy an exception and a challenge to the legal system, she welcomes it as the source of progress embedded in the law.
59
In contrast to the dualist view that revolution creates and stands apart from the constituted legal order, Everson embeds revolution in the day-to-day business of the legal order. She notes that under the dualist structure, revolution, which takes place at the exceptional constitutional moment outside the constituted order, is liable to degenerate into violence. order. Rather, principles of proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity are regarded as the transformer for legal indeterminacy to function as the midwife of the 'Rechtsverfassungsrecht' in the paradigm of reflexive law. 64 Specifically, by way of fleshing out the legal procedural mechanisms inherent in the principles of proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity with 'systematic legal consensus' and 'deliberative democratic experimentalism,' Everson suggests that the ECJ has not only constitutionalized but also given democracy to the European legal order.
65
While the constituent power is removed from the evolution of European constitutional ordering, through Everson's theoretical lens, European constitutionalism is radicalized as the 'Rechtsverfassungsrecht' in the process of lawyerly daily renovation, dissolving the democracy deficit at the heart of the criticism of the EU. In her account of European constitutional ordering, legal reflexivity is more than a general proposition of how the law relates to the real world. 64 Ibid. 178-80, 220-23. 65 Ibid. 178-89. 66 Ibid. 220-24. 67 See e.g. Stein, (n 1); Weiler, (n 2); Maduro, (n 36). 68 See e.g. P. To test this account, in
Chapter 3 she explains the ECJ's oscillation as its progressive responses to the real-world needs, while in Chapter 4, she, aided by Eisner, switches the focus to an empirical study of the legal minds involved. Based on their structured interviews and questionnaire surveys,
Everson and Eisner manage to establish that legal professionals tend to take refuge in legal formalism in the face of the challenges of legal indeterminacy to the legitimacy of the law.
75
In the second half of the book, Everson begins by focusing on another subject matter in the ECJ's jurisprudence. In Chapter 5, she examines how, with the EU's institutional 74 In economic market cases, Everson argues that facilitating the establishment of a European internal market is the ECJ's central concern. In contrast, in the field of noneconomic, social affairs, the ECJ manages to control the impact of the expansive economic logic on the fabric of social security in the member states. expansion, the principle of institutional balance comes closer to its domestic sibling, the separation of powers principle, the core of which is to protect individual freedom by limiting government powers. 76 Before concluding in Chapter 7, Everson, again in collaboration with Eisner, undertakes an empirical study in Chapter 6 of how legal professionals position themselves in relation to the principle of institutional balance. They note that lawyers and judges adopt the language of legal formalism to maintain the separation between law and politics. 77 Moreover, Everson and Eisner argue that in the guise of formalistic doctrines such as the principles of proportionality, rationality, and subsidiarity, an innovative reconnection between European law and democracy is to be found.
78
On this view, the ECJ has not only constitutionalized but also laid the democratic foundations for the European legal order.
At first blush, the organization reflects Everson's asserted approach. Putting the law and judicial decisions to the test of empirical study is expected to unveil the truth of the law that has been disguised by legal formalism. Claiming to substantiate their argument with empirical methodologies such as 75 Ibid. 105-17. 76 Ibid. 125-31. 77 Ibid. 186-90. 78 Ibid. 178-79. 79 Ibid. 97-98. 80 The first prong of their empirical studies includes only five semi-structured interviews and 44 valid questionnaire samples out of the 166 original surveys they sent out. In addition, all their interviews and questionnaire surveys are targeted at British legal professionals. Ibid. 98. In their second prong of empirical studies, only 17 out of the 200 original questionnaires sent to the members of all the EU institutions and the members of the Convention were filled out and returned. Ibid. 196 problem is that theirs is anecdotal, not systematic.
Thus, the empirical studies conducted by Everson and Eisner are methodologically problematic. However, in terms of the approach of empirical studies to law, the methodological issues are too obvious for Everson and Eisner to overlook. For example, in Chapter 6, they are aware that the poor response rate and the disparity in the responses among the EU institutions constitute 'distorting factors' for their findings and inferences. 88 Thus, to make sense of the apparent methodological distortion, it is necessary to look into how they approach their issues.
Everson places 'critical legal scholarship' front and centre in her methodology.
89
Corresponding to her claimed inspiration from critical legal scholarship, Everson draws attention to the use of empirical studies. On the other, CLS politicizes the legal system much further than legal realists originally thought. 93 Seen in this light, if we take her word for it, Everson seems to locate herself in the social-sciences strand of the postrealist counterrevolution after the fall of legal classicism.
However, she expressly distances herself from this camp, defending the law against Commission, which has distributed significant research funds to legal scholars. 108 The long-term effect of this collaboration between technocracy and academia remains to be further assessed. However, it is evident that with the constantly changing politics of European constitutional development, legal scholars seem to be on call and ready to lend theoretical support to the arcane, chameleon-like European constitutional politics. 109 This explains the changes in the attitude of European legal scholars toward the Constitutional Treaty. Rooted in the pre-Convention legalistic path, they had held a cautious attitude toward the draft Constitutional Treaty before French and Dutch voters went to the voting booths. 110 In contrast, once the negative results were announced in France and the Netherlands, they cast critical eyes on the strategic choice of unifying the sporadic European constitutional laws into a single 'constitutional' document. 111 It is true that theory and practice are related to and nurture each other. 112 It is anachronistic naiveté to maintain the separation between academics and politics. Through her lens of assumed legal neutrality, she naturally gives the benefit of the doubt to the ECJ, which, as a judiciary, is regarded as the embodiment of the neutrality of the legal system, if all legal grammars are followed.
Instead of making sense of the ECJ jurisprudence in light of European politics, she interprets the constitutional politics of the EU in accordance with the ECJ's doctrinal oscillation. As a result, the assumption of legal neutrality contributes to Everson's centring on the ECJ in her theory, illustrating a tendency of academics involved in the debates on European constitutional politics. While the free law movement has been regarded as the European counterpart to
American legal realism as well as the subsequent CLS movement, 117 it did not shake the centuries-old European legal tradition. 118 This tradition is not only about a mentality towards a definitive, correct answer to the law 119 but also related to the proposition that the tool to find that definitive, correct answer lies in the traditional legal methodology. What characterizes the epistemic foundations of the European legal tradition is the belief that through dogmatic legal pedagogy, the legal texts can be illuminated, leading to the emergence of the correct answer.
120
This centuries-old tradition has seen challenges but persists.
121
The post-Revolution reaction to issues regarding legal interpretation and judicial discretion in France is a case in point. Judges of the parlements were criticized for abusing judicial discretion by inserting their political positions into ambiguous legal texts.
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In response, on the one hand, laws were made more specific to minimize the chances of judicial discretion. The result was the French Civil Code. 123 and lawapplying, 124 for the Continental legal tradition, the threat to the rule of law came from lawapplying, not lawmaking. 125 The politicization of the law by means of discretion could be avoided by improved skills in legislation such as 'codification'. 126 On the other hand, judges were commanded to follow formal syllogistic legal reasoning in order to guarantee that the law would not be distorted. 127 Given a strong belief in the distinction between lawmaking and lawapplying, the problem of the politicization of law has been confined to lawapplying, while lawmaking has been regarded as the expression of sovereign will, which is legitimately political or rather politicized. 128 The conceptual framework of the political and epistemic foundations of the European legal tradition as illustrated in the post-Revolution French debate on the role of the judiciary helps to understand how the European legal profession has dissolved the subsequent challenges to the European legal tradition, including the existential challenge to European law during the Nazi era. 129 way for the takeover of power by Nazis in Germany, 130 the practice of the purposive interpretation of the law in accordance with the Führer's will by Nazi judges has been diagnosed as the pathology of the European legal tradition. 131 Thus, responses to that darker legacy in Europe have been focused on the return to the centuries-old tradition of the European legal profession. 132 Restoring legal neutrality in lawapplying is the antidote to the Nazi pathology. 133 To European lawyers, the legal tradition is the solution, not the problem.
In contrast, the reaction to legal classicism following the Lochner era in the United
States was revolutionary. 134 On the one hand, the political foundations of the legal system, the Supreme Court in particular, were called into question. The Lochner Court and its legal formalism were criticized for implanting capitalist economic ideology into American constitutional jurisprudence. 135 As a consequence, the Supreme Court barely survived with its (in)famous 'switch in time' under the threat of court packing. 136 There is no need to repeat this all-too-familiar history. What is noticeable in the reactions to the political judging of the Lochner Court is the political understanding of the law. As indicated above, unlike its European counterpart, the American legal culture, rooted in the common law tradition, does not maintain a clear distinction between lawmaking and lawapplying. 137 Moreover, Congress in the American constitutional structure does not have the sovereign status enjoyed by its European counterparts in their legal tradition. Sovereignty is embodied in the Constitution, not statutory legislation. 138 Thus, the question of the politicization of the law is not restricted to the judiciary. With the unmasking of the legal neutrality traditionally maintained by formalistic judging, formalistic legal reasoning is regarded as an accomplice to the political hijacking of the law. 139 Both the political and epistemic foundations of legal classicism in American jurisprudence were undermined in the realist reaction to the Lochner era and its formalist accomplices.
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As noted above, facing the postrealist crisis of American legal scholarship, two reactions arose. One was to play along with the political hijacking of the legal system.
On this view, the problem is not the politicization of the law but instead its bad politicization. This resulted in the CLS movement.
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The other postrealist reaction to the politicization of the law was to confront the problem head-on. The law should not be captured by politics. To save the law from political hijacking is to depoliticize the law.
This echoes the post-WWII reaction to the Nazi jurisprudence in Europe. However, Everson's epistemic tools for achieving legal neutrality and autonomy may look trickier. On the one hand, she distances herself from traditional legal formalists.
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On the other hand, she also keeps social scientists at arm's length, despite her claim to use empirical studies tools.
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Facing this dilemma, she turns to the idea of legal reflexivity with an eye to maintaining legal neutrality and autonomy by bridging the gap between the law and real-world issues. will survive with the consensus that holds the professional community of law together, 150 Fish makes a contrary diagnosis, announcing the death of law simply because of too many communities in the law. 151 Leaving aside the CLS movement that hails the politicization of the law, while there have been continued attempts to re-establish legal knowledge outside the traditional legal methodology in the postrealist refounding of legal discipline, the social sciences strand that attempts to restore the independence of law from politics does not speak with one voice. It turns out that lawyers, academics as well as practioners, are faced with competing claims to truth. 152 'Law and…movements' speak to the epistemic pluralism in American law. 153 Taken as whole, in a legal culture such as the United States in which the consensus that holds a legal epistemic community together has disintegrated, it is hard to identify a clear, agreed-upon way to legal knowledge. On the contrary, in Europe, as Everson and Eisner's book shows, even in different garbs, European legal professionals remain united on a form of consensus rooted in the culture of a professional community. 154 In sum, Everson's legalist-constructivist theory of European constitutional development not only suggests that her theory remains rooted in the path of constitutionalization set out in the Community era of European integration but also characterizes the professional community of law, which she exemplifies well.
What is more, the fact that Everson's theory, in conceiving the constitutional order in Europe, is premised on the professional community also reveals the limits of this legalistic approach to European constitutionalism. Whether attempts to repoliticize European constitutional development can deliver on the promise that legal elites fail to fulfil with their theories and academic lawyering remains to be seen. 155 Nevertheless, it is not difficult to figure out how wide the gap between the professional community and the European citizenry is. As Everson emphasizes, the negation of the Constitutional Treaty in French and Dutch referenda was a popular no-confidence vote on European political elites.
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However, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty cannot be considered a reaction only to political elites. Rather, the creation of the Constitutional Treaty itself was a response to the detachment of European citizens from the entire pre-Convention constitutional order.
157
The defeat of the Constitutional Treaty reflects the failure of the responsive strategy as a whole.
Thus, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty is anything but an affirmation of the pre-Convention constitutional order. Rather, it reveals the naiveté of the constitutional symbolism that the Convention adopted in response to a deep challenge to the European constitutional order.
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The inadequacy of Everson's partial diagnosis of the fate of the Constitutional Treaty is betrayed in the current stalemate of the Lisbon Treaty, which is a return to the pre-Convention strategy.
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If the indifference and alienation of the European citizenry in relation to the status quo of the European constitutional order is the main issue facing European constitutionalism, it also reveals the gap between legal elites and citizens in 155 See U. Haltern, 'On Finality' in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), (n 3). 156 (n 8) 1-2. 157 See de Búrca, (n 6) 561-63, 571-73 (discussing the gap between the motives and the reality of the creation of the Constitutional Treaty as a response to the legitimacy deficit of the EU). See also de Búrca, (n 111) at 205-06. 158 See Haltern, (n 155). But see J Přibáň, Legal Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2007) (discussing and defending legal symbolism especially in the domain of constitutional law). 159 See Pernice, (n 16). Cf de Búrca, (n 15) (noting the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty as 'the latest manifestation of an ongoing and profoundly challenging popular legitimacy crisis experienced by the EU since the time of the Maastricht Treaty').
Europe. 160 As Everson and Eisner's book illustrates, the legalistic view of European constitutional development is premised on a professional community. To generalize this legalistic view of constitutionalism as a popularly held constitutional order suggests either the projection of a professional community onto a Europe-wide civic culture or the self-appointment of legal professionals as the fiduciary of the citizenry. 161 Each is a fiction, however. This fictional character of the legalist-constructivist strategy to European constitutional politics is the underlying cause of the dilemma facing European constitutional ordering.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between law and politics is the Gordian knot of legal theory and constitutional scholarship. Constitutional dualism takes its place among other numerous attempts to put law and politics in their places. 162 As Everson and Eisner's book meticulously shows, constitutional dualism is flawed by locating politics outside the boundary of law. 163 However, they do not ultimately do a better job than their dualist opponents. They give short shrift to the role of politics in the process of constitutional ordering, which constitutional dualists aim but fail to address. This requires a form of consensus, which not only sustains a professional community of European jurists but also lays the common epistemic grounds for the belief in legal autonomy. 'Community' is the cornerstone of Everson's theoretical cathedral.
Everson is right to point out that unlike constitutional dualism, politics is constantly involved in the process of constitutional (re)ordering. However, in establishing her legalist-constructivist notion of 'Rechtsverfassungsrecht', Everson does not tell her citizen readers how politics, which involves not only politicians, professional groups, but also the citizens at large, has actually played out in the process of European constitutionalization.
Instead, as I have noted, she fixes her eyes on the legal minds without much of the empirical support that she promises. At best, she points out that legal indeterminacy provides an interface between law and politics and portrays the role of academic lawyering in the 
